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ABSTRACT
Benjamin M. Lawsky and the New York State Department of
Financial Services upended the regulatory dynamics of the
international banking world in August of 2012 when the New York
agency reached a staggering settlement with Standard Chartered
Bank. The Department of Financial Services accused the bank,
which is headquartered in London, but maintains a profitable branch
in New York, of violating laws related to United States sanctions
imposed upon certain financial transactions with Iran. Although
allegations of this sort are not unprecedented, Lawsky’s actions and
the $340 million settlement were alarming because, in this case, the
state regulator acted without any involvement from federal
regulators, who were “on the verge of concluding” that the majority
of Standard Chartered’s transactions with Iran were legal.
The settlement illustrates the tension between state and federal
regulators when confronted with alleged violations of law committed
by a foreign bank. Specifically, the settlement raises the question of
whether a state regulator should be involved in the regulation of a
foreign bank operating in the United States, particularly when the
bank is primarily violating federal laws that implicate issues of
foreign policy. This Comment examines these issues, starting with
an introduction of the statutory framework regarding the regulation
of foreign banks, followed by a discussion of the various reactions to
the Standard Chartered settlement, both positive and negative. This
Comment then provides recommendations for resolving the issues
raised by the settlement, ultimately concluding that the principle of
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of
Michigan, 2010. I would like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement
throughout my entire lifetime. I would also like to thank my advisor, Professor Sean
Griffith, for his guidance and recommendations regarding this subject matter. Finally, I
would like to thank my father who, although no longer with us, showed me how to be
strong and courageous in the face of adversity.
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comity paves the way for proper coordination and deference to the
appropriate authority—whether state or federal—in the case of
overlapping regulatory jurisdiction.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1022
I. FOREIGN BANKS OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES .............. 1024
A. RISE IN FOREIGN BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES.................................................................................. 1024
B. INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978 ................................. 1025
C. FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1991 ... 1026
D. STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY AFTER THE IBA AND
FBSEA ................................................................................. 1028
E. NEW YORK BANKING LAW ..................................................... 1028
II. STANDARD CHARTERED’S SETTLEMENT WITH THE DFS ......... 1030
A. ACTIVITIES OF STANDARD CHARTERED IN THE UNITED
STATES.................................................................................. 1030
B. THE SETTLEMENT ................................................................... 1031
C. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE SETTLEMENT................................. 1032
D. POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE SETTLEMENT ............................. 1034
E. NEGATIVE RESPONSES TO THE SETTLEMENT ........................... 1035
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUES ARISING
FROM THE DFS SETTLEMENT .................................................... 1037
A. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR ENFORCE FEDERAL LAWS
AGAINST A FOREIGN BANK? ................................................. 1037
B. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE ABLE TO ACT
INDEPENDENTLY OF FEDERAL REGULATORS? ....................... 1040
C. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE INVOLVING ITSELF IN
ISSUES OF FOREIGN POLICY? ................................................. 1042
D. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE INVOLVED IN THE
REGULATION OF A FOREIGN BANK OPERATING IN THE
UNITED STATES AT ALL? ...................................................... 1046
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1048
INTRODUCTION
On August 6, 2012, the New York State Department of Financial
Services (“DFS”) issued an order pursuant to New York Banking Law
Section 39, accusing Standard Chartered Bank (“Standard Chartered”)
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of engaging in illicit dollar-clearing transactions with Iran.1 The order
directed Standard Chartered, a London-based bank, to appear and
explain apparent violations of law; demonstrate why Standard
Chartered’s license to operate in the State of New York should not be
revoked; demonstrate why Standard Chartered’s United States dollar
clearing operations should not be suspended pending a formal license
revocation hearing, and submit to and pay for an independent, onpremises monitor of the DFS’s choosing to ensure compliance with rules
governing the international transfer of funds.2 On August 14, 2012, one
day before Standard Chartered was to appear before the DFS, the parties
agreed to settle the matters in the DFS order from August 6, 2012.3 The
settlement required Standard Chartered to pay a civil penalty of $340
million to the DFS.4 Notably, the order and the ensuing settlement took
place without any intervention from or coordination with federal
regulators.5
While some commentators lauded the DFS and its superintendent
Benjamin M. Lawsky for their aggressive stance against violations of
federal and state banking laws, others criticized the settlement as a rogue
undertaking that failed to allow federal regulators an adequate
opportunity to intervene in the matter.6 Whether Mr. Lawsky and the
1. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, Standard Chartered Bank, 1
(NYS Dep’t. of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/ea/
ea120806.pdf.
2. Id. at 2.
3. See Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Statement from Benjamin M. Lawsky,
Superintendent of Financial Services, Regarding Standard Chartered Bank (Aug. 14,
2012), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/pr1208141.htm.
4. Id.
5. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Laundering Case Settled by Bank for $340
Million, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/15/business/standard-chartered-settles-with-new-york-for-340million.html?pagewanted=all.
6. Compare Jonathan Weil, Standard Chartered Fought the Lawsky and the
Lawsky Won, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-08-16/standard-chartered-fought-the-lawsky-and-the-lawsky-won.html
(explaining that the public benefits from having an active, competent, and functional
state regulator that is willing to seek large penalties from banks), with Peter J. Henning,
What’s Next in the Standard Chartered Case, DEALBOOK (Aug. 8, 2012, 4:43 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/whats-next-in-the-standard-chartered-case/
(discussing the problems that arose due to the lack of coordination between the DFS
and federal regulators), and Somasekhar Sundaresan, New York State Erodes Rule of
Law with Standard Chartered Bank, BUSINESS STANDARD (Aug. 20, 2012),
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/new-york-state-erodes-rulelawstandard-

1024

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVIII

DFS deserve praise or criticism, the settlement between the DFS and
Standard Chartered raises some serious regulatory issues regarding the
extent to which a state regulator should be involved in the regulation of
a foreign bank operating in the United States, particularly when the bank
is primarily violating federal laws that implicate issues of foreign
policy.7
Part I of this Comment will describe the role of foreign banks in the
United States banking system and the statutory framework regarding the
regulation of those banks. Part II will parse out the issues arising from
the DFS settlement with Standard Chartered and will discuss the
positive and negative responses to the settlement. Finally, Part III of
this Comment will address the framework required to alleviate the issues
arising from overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, concluding that the
basic principle of comity paves the way for proper coordination and
deference to the appropriate regulatory authority.
I. FOREIGN BANKS OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES
Part I of this Comment provides a background of foreign banking
operations in the United States and the statutory framework regarding
the regulation of those banks. Specifically, this Part describes the
federal regulatory scheme that Congress has implemented through the
International Banking Act of 1978 (“IBA”) and the Foreign Bank
Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (“FBSEA”). It then discusses
the remaining power of state regulators over foreign banks, including an
explanation of the DFS’s powers, such as the ability to utilize Section 39
of the New York Banking Law.
A. RISE IN FOREIGN BANKING OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Foreign banks are permitted to operate in the United States through
various corporate forms.8 The decision regarding how to enter and
chartered-bank/483734/ (suggesting that it is improper for a state regulator to involve
itself in issues relating to international relations between the United States and a foreign
nation).
7. See generally Janet Babin, Settlement Spotlights Upstart N.Y. Regulator, NPR
(Aug. 18, 2012, 2:12 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/18/159066054/settlementshines-light-on-n-y-regulator-agency; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5.
8. MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS AND
AFFILIATES IN THE UNITED STATES 34 (5th ed. 2008).
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operate in the United States banking market is significant for foreign
banks because it may result in certain operational and regulatory
consequences.9 A branch of a foreign bank operating in the United
States is subject to less regulation than a separately incorporated,
federally-insured bank subsidiary, which may be why foreign banks
often choose to set up their United States operations in this manner.10
Indeed, there were 214 foreign bank branches in the United States as of
December 31, 2007, accounting for 72.5% of all foreign banking assets
in the nation.11
Foreign banks, whether operating through branches or other
corporate forms, have dramatically increased their presence in the
United States commercial banking market.12 As a result, foreign banks
have served to expand credit in the United States, promote financial
innovation and foreign investment, and enhance the globalization of
United States banking markets.13 The rise of foreign banking activity in
the United States, however, prompted Congress to enact a
comprehensive federal regulatory structure to govern the operations of
foreign banks.14 Legislation such as the International Banking Act of
1978 and the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991
marks a notable trend toward more federal oversight of those foreign
banks operating in the United States.15
B. INTERNATIONAL BANKING ACT OF 1978
Concerned that foreign banks operating in the United States were
not receiving proper supervision from federal regulators, Congress
enacted the IBA to create a more adequate legal framework for
regulating such banks.16 Most importantly, the IBA shifted major
responsibility for the oversight of foreign banks to the federal level.17

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
See id. at 37–38.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7. Congress passed other federal statutes regarding the regulation of
foreign banking activities in the United States. However, this Comment will discuss
only the IBA and the FBSEA, since they are most relevant.
16. Id. at 4, 8.
17. John P. Segala, A Summary of the International Banking Act of 1978, FRB
RICHMOND ECON. REV., Jan./Feb. 1979, at 16, 19.
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Indeed, the IBA was “designed to improve federal control over
monetary policy” and allow federal regulators to become more involved
in supervising the activities of foreign banks in the United States.18
Prior to the IBA, it was most common for state banking regulators,
rather than federal authorities, to license and supervise foreign banking
operations in the United States.19 After the IBA was enacted, branches
and agencies of foreign banks were able to obtain federal licenses from
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), subjecting them
to primary regulation by the OCC, instead of being limited to state
licenses and corresponding state regulation.20 In addition, the IBA
provides supervisory authority to several regulators, including the OCC,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the states.21 These regulators were able to assert jurisdiction over
those foreign banks that operated within its territory, enabling the
regulatory authorities to perform examinations and reviews as
necessary.22 Accordingly, foreign banks now must contend with
overlapping layers of federal and state regulatory regimes.23
C. FOREIGN BANK SUPERVISION ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 1991
Congress renewed its attempt in the late 1980s and early 1990s to
establish a meaningful role for federal authorities in foreign bank
regulation.24 As a result, Congress passed the FBSEA in 1991, which
introduced new methods of approval and monitoring of foreign banks
and created heightened responsibility for the Federal Reserve Board in
the regulatory process.25 In so doing, the FBSEA substantially increased

18. See id. at 20; see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 10 (explaining that
the IBA achieved Congress’ desire to establish a “federal presence” in the regulation
and supervision of foreign bank activities in the United States).
19. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 7–8.
20. See 12 U.S.C. § 3102 (2006); see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 9.
21. Segala, supra note 21, at 19.
22. Id.
23. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 10.
24. Id. In particular, the collapse of Bank of Commerce Credit International led
policymakers to question the effectiveness of United States supervision of foreign
banking operations. These concerns were amplified after “widespread media accounts
of unauthorized lending to Iraq by the U.S. operations of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.”
Id.
25. Id.
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the authority federal regulators have regarding foreign banks operating
in the United States.26
Prior to the FBSEA, a foreign bank needed only to obtain the
approval of the state or federal licensing authority to open a branch in
the United States.27 Now, section 202 of the FBSEA requires advance
Federal Reserve approval, as well, for a foreign bank to establish any
branch in the United States.28 Pursuant to the FBSEA, the Federal
Reserve may only offer approval if the foreign bank operates its nonU.S. business is directly within the field of banking, it is adequately
overseen by the appropriate local authorities in its home country, and it
provides the Federal Reserve with all materials necessary to conduct a
proper assessment of the bank’s application.29
Section 7(e) of the IBA, which was enacted as part of the FBSEA,
permits the Federal Reserve to close any United States office of a
foreign bank.30 In addition, the FBSEA authorizes the Board to examine
any foreign bank office, although it is directed to coordinate its
examinations with the OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), and state banking authorities whenever possible.31 This
requirement serves to ameliorate the consequences of overlapping
jurisdiction and encourages a more unified examination process.32
To coordinate the examination process, the Board has worked with
several other regulators, including the OCC, the FDIC, the NYSBD, 33
and state authorities.34 For example, the Federal Reserve Board and the
26. Stephen J. Field, Scott N. Benedict, & Francoise M. Haan, New Law
Significantly Increases Regulation of Foreign Banks in U.S., reprinted in FEDERAL
SUPERVISION OF FOREIGN BANKS IN THE U.S. 40 (George M. Cohen et al. eds., 1992).
27. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 11. In practice, most banks obtained only
the approval of the state licensing authority because relatively few foreign banks chose
to apply for a federal license directly from the OCC. See id.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(1) (2006); GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 11; Field,
Benedict, & Haan, supra note 26, at 41.
29. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(d)(2); GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 11–12.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(e); Field, Benedict, & Haan, supra note 26, at 41.
31. 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(B)(i). See GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 13.
32. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(B); GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 57.
Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve is not required to rely on examination reports
prepared by the other supervisory authorities. Field, Benedict, & Haan, supra note 26,
at 43.
33. In 2011, the New York State Banking Department (“NYSBD”) and the New
York State Insurance Department were merged to create the DFS. See Standard
Chartered Bank 6 n.8 (NYS Dep’t. of Fin. Servs. Aug. 6, 2012).
34. See GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 57–58.
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FDIC entered into a national agreement in December of 1998 with state
banking departments to coordinate state examination activities with
those of the Board and the FDIC.35 The agreement requires states to
designate a specific Federal Reserve Bank and FDIC Regional Office to
be responsible for examination and supervisory obligations.36 Foreign
banks, therefore, enjoy a single regulatory point of contact for
In addition, the State
scheduling and planning examinations.37
Coordination Agreement allows for one state-banking supervisor to
coordinate the examination and supervision of a foreign bank licensed in
multiple states.38
D. STATE REGULATORY AUTHORITY AFTER THE IBA AND FBSEA
While the Federal Reserve gained more regulatory prominence
under the FBSEA, the licensing authority, whether the OCC or the state,
is still an important part in supervising the operations of those foreign
banks within its jurisdiction.39 While the IBA provided foreign banks
with the option of applying for a federal or state license, most foreign
banks still choose to obtain a license from the state in which they
reside.40 This choice reflects a bank’s decision to submit to primary
regulation by the state rather than federal authorities.41 Accordingly,
state banking regulators license the most foreign banks and have
retained a significant amount of power to supervise foreign banks that
are operating within their jurisdiction.42
E. NEW YORK BANKING LAW
New York Banking Law (“N.Y. Banking Law”) requires every
licensed foreign banking corporation operating in the state to maintain
appropriate documentation of its in-state transactions and transactions
involving any other office of the foreign bank that is located outside the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. at 58.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 74.
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state.43 The superintendent of the DFS may examine all of the books,
records, and accounts of any agency or branch of a foreign bank located
in New York State.44 The superintendent may also examine any books,
records, and accounts of other offices of the foreign bank that are
maintained in New York.45 Because foreign banks have established a
significant banking presence in New York,46 these powers retained by
the superintendent are significant.47 In addition, every foreign bank
licensed in the state must prepare written reports describing its asset,
liabilities and other pertinent matters as requested by the
superintendent.48
Foreign banks seeking to open branches in New York must satisfy
initial requirements similar to those specified in the FBSEA.49 For
instance, the superintendent must consider the home country’s
regulatory regime and the extent of that regime’s jurisdiction over the
bank and whether the bank will be able to provide enough information
regarding its operations and activities.50 In fact, New York amended its
application requirements after passage of the FBSEA to more closely
parallel those of the Federal Reserve.51 Furthermore, the superintendent
has the power to issue orders directing foreign banking corporations to
appear and explain an apparent violation of law, discontinue
unauthorized unsafe practices, make good an impairment of the required
capital, make good encroachments on required services, and keep books
and accounts as prescribed by the superintendent.52 Notably, the statute
lacks any indication that only violations of state law can produce a
sanction.53

43. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 200-c (McKinney 2008); 10 N.Y. JUR. 2D Banks § 585
(2013).
44. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 36(4); see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 85.
45. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 36(4); see also GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 85.
46. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 75.
47. Cf. Henning, supra note 8 (pointing out that Lawsky, as head of the DFS, has
unusual powers under the N.Y. Banking Law to affect the operations of a foreign bank).
48. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 204. See also 10 N.Y. JUR. 2D Banks § 585.
49. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 77.
50. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 3, Supervisory Policy FB § 1.2 (2013);
GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 77.
51. GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 78.
52. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 39. This provision supplied the DFS with the statutory
authority to issue the order on August 6, 2012 to Standard Chartered Bank.
53. Henning, supra note 8.
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II. STANDARD CHARTERED’S SETTLEMENT WITH THE DFS
Part II of this Comment describes the operations and activities of
Standard Chartered in the United States. It also discusses Standard
Chartered’s settlement with the DFS, identifying the issues at stake and
introducing the range of responses to the settlement.
A. ACTIVITIES OF STANDARD CHARTERED IN THE UNITED STATES
Standard Chartered is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Standard
Chartered PLC, a British bank with a strong international presence.54
Licensed to operate in New York State,55 Standard Chartered PLC offers
many products and services to its clients, including its dollar clearing
operations, which add substantially to Standard Chartered PLC’s
revenue.56 The United States Government, through the Office of
Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), regulates these dollar clearing
operations by imposing sanctions against those who attempt to use the
United States’ financial system in contravention of United States foreign
policy or present a threat to national security such as Iran, North Korea,
and the Sudan.57 From 2001 to 2010, Standard Chartered allegedly
engaged in dollar clearing transactions with Iran called “U-Turns”,
which were permitted for some time under limited circumstances and
with close regulatory supervision. 58 In November 2008, however, the
United States Treasury Department revoked authorization for “U-Turn”
transactions with Iran due to concerns that Iranian banks were using that
money to purchase nuclear weapons.59
In an order issued on August 6, 2012, the DFS accused Standard
Chartered of designing and implementing an elaborate scheme to clear
illegal transactions in U.S. dollars with Iran by using its New York
branch as a front for the prohibited dealings.60 According to the DFS,
these dealings with Iran threatened peace and stability internationally.61
Among the violations of law propounded by the DFS were
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 1, 5.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 5, 6.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 22.

2013]

REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS

1031

“unauthorized transactions” pursuant to 31 C.F.R. 560.516, which was
promulgated by OFAC and regulates the transfer of funds involving
Iran.62 According to the DFS, any banking institution that engages in
“unauthorized transactions” is unsafe and unsound.63
B. THE SETTLEMENT
On August 14, 2012, the DFS and Standard Chartered agreed to
settle.64 Both entities agreed that the transactions were worth at least
$250 billion.65 The settlement included the following terms: Standard
Chartered was obligated to pay a civil penalty of $340 million to the
DFS, install a monitor for two or more years to ensure that appropriate
money-laundering risk controls and corrective measures are firmly in
place in the New York branch, and permanently install personnel to
ensure that the bank’s compliance with due diligence and monitoring
requirements.66
Commentators agree that the settlement was a “victory” for
Benjamin Lawsky and the DFS, which confronted the bank without any
involvement of federal regulators;67 however, some federal authorities
were concerned that the deal could compromise their abilities to reach
settlements with the bank.68 Indeed, the actions also perturbed British
authorities who felt that Lawsky was spoiling their banks’ reputation.69
In his defense, Lawsky explained that he was pressured to act in the face
of Standard Chartered’s continuing breach of compliance measures
regarding bank secrecy and money-laundering.70
In any case, the $340 million fine was an enormous sum for a
single state regulator to reap from a settlement with a foreign bank.71
Banking industry officials have said that this type of occurrence—a state
regulator, acting on its own, threatens to take away the state license of a
global bank and then secures a public settlement of this magnitude—is

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 22.
Press Release, Dep’t of Fin. Servs., supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unprecedented;72 however, there is a reason why the DFS was able to
take the lead in the case against a multinational financial institution
rather than adhering to the ordinary procedure and deferring to federal
regulators and prosecutors.73 In most cases, a state banking regulator is
not able to exert much control over foreign banks.74 The dynamics of
this situation were different, however, because the DFS oversees bank
operations in New York.75 As New York stands as the American
financial hub, a foreign bank seeking to do business in the U.S. is
virtually required to perform its transactions in the state.76 Therefore,
the DFS had the rare ability to affect the business of a foreign bank with
only minor operations in the United States.77 Furthermore, because the
scope of Section 39 of the N.Y. Banking Law is not limited to violations
of state law, Lawsky possessed the legal authority to accuse Standard
Chartered of violating federal law prohibiting certain dealings with
Iran.78
C. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE SETTLEMENT
Lawsky’s claim that Standard Chartered violated state law by
concealing pertinent information from American investigations enabled
him to achieve a grand settlement.79 Nonetheless, critics point to two
major problems with this approach. First, the Department of Justice was
in the midst of deciding not to file criminal charges just prior to DFS’s
actions, after concluding that the Iranian transactions substantially
complied with federal law.80 And second, DFS failed to include any
federal regulators in its investigation and subsequent action against the
bank.81 In fact, the DFS appeared to intentionally keep the federal

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Babin, supra note 7.
See Henning, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5.
Id.
Id. Lawsky has been unapologetic in his approach, despite the widespread
criticism he has faced. Id.
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authorities in the dark once it commenced its investigation of Standard
Chartered.82
There is another significant issue raised by the settlement with the
DFS. A New York State banking license is necessary for banks doing
business with United States currency.83 Trades in United States
currency must be cleared through the United States, and this effectively
means that such trades must be processed in New York, because that is
where the nation’s financial institutions are primarily located and where
the most important banking transactions typically occur.84 Therefore, it
is impossible to tell whether Standard Chartered actually settled with the
DFS on the grounds that it egregiously violated state and federal laws or
whether the settlement was a result of intense pressure levied by the
unusually powerful position of a New York State regulator.85 In other
words, the settlement may have been more a representation of the
potential costs of a DFS sanction involving the revocation of Standard
Chartered’s license and not the scope Standard Chartered’s illegal acts.86
Finally, and more generally, the Standard Chartered settlement
illustrates the problems associated with the growth in overlapping layers
of federal and state regulation.87 This expansion has forced banks to
confront a “prosecutorial maze” when defending against alleged
violations of banking law.88 In practice, banks operating in the United
States may be subject to examination by different branches of one
federal agency as well as other federal and/or state regulators.89
Moreover, the termination of an investigation by one agency does not
mean that another will discontinue its own investigation and possible
enforcement measures.90 While these overlaps could be minimized by
means of inter-regulatory coordination,91 the Standard Chartered case
82.
83.

Babin, supra note 7.
Tim Worstall, Did Standard Chartered Settle With the DFS? Or Were They
Mugged by It?, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2012, 8:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
timworstall/2012/08/15/did-standard-chartered-settle-with-the-dfs-or-were-theymugged-by-it/.
84. Id. (explaining that a New York State banking license is essential for any bank
conducting business in U.S. dollars).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. The Prosecutorial Maze, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 2012, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21564563.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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illustrates that meaningful communications among agencies are often
lacking, undermining regulatory efficiency.
D. POSITIVE RESPONSES TO THE SETTLEMENT
The DFS settlement with Standard Chartered challenged the
ordinary regulatory paradigm in which state regulators cower behind the
Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, and the Department of
Justice,92 but one could argue that what occurred in this case actually
served to benefit the public.93 The fact that federal regulators were
compelled to seek larger penalties for their own settlements with
Standard Chartered can be seen as a positive.94 In fact, having an active,
competent, functional state regulator can only be beneficial because it
would force the federal government to better oversee, rather than
protect, large banks.95
The settlement also undermined Standard Chartered’s assertion that
it had conducted only $14 million of illegal transactions with Iran.96
Although Lawsky estimated the figure at $250 billion, the $340 million
deal appears to vindicate the DFS’s claims that the illegal transactions
were worth far more than $14 million.97 In addition, one could argue
that Lawsky and the DFS had clear jurisdiction over the matter because
it involved violations of state law.98 If the crux of the allegations were
that Standard Chartered lied to the DFS about complying with an
agreement to correct deficiencies in its anti-money-laundering systems
and that Standard Chartered lied in its books and records about its
transactions with Iran, then N.Y. Banking Law empowers the DFS to
bring such an action against a foreign bank.99 Ultimately, one could
point to the federal government’s lackluster job of overseeing large
banks and argue that someone needed to step in and be forceful for
once.100 That someone was Benjamin Lawsky, a former federal

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Weil, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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prosecutor who was willing to step up and promote justice by penalizing
those institutions that violated federal and state laws.101
E. NEGATIVE RESPONSES TO THE SETTLEMENT
Critics of the DFS settlement with Standard Chartered point out the
difficulties inherent in a state agency asserting authority over federal
issues. Since the DFS is not a federal agency, like the Federal Reserve
or the Department of Justice, it does not account for the interests of the
entire nation or the means of interstate trade.102 In addition, the DFS
interfered in a matter involving United States foreign relations,103
traditionally reserved for the federal government.104 Therefore, the DFS
engaged in part in the regulation of banking activity without any specific
relevance to New York State.105
Some critics focus on the DFS’s use of coercion to force the
settlement upon Standard Chartered. Since Standard Chartered neither
admitted nor denied fault in its settlement agreements and since
settlement talks are confidential, whether the bank settled because it
actually committed the violations or because it merely sought to lessen
its reputational damage and prolonged press coverage will, in all
likelihood, never be publicly known.106 The bank faced serious charges
from a critical regulator and the potential loss of its license to operate in
New York, which would have devastated its operations and revenue.107
Therefore, if Standard Chartered agreed to the settlement only because it
felt that it had no other choice, then the DFS could be seen as extracting
payments through threats,108 which is an improper government agency
action.109 Of notable focus is the risk to Standard Chartered’s reputation
resulting from the DFS’s actions.110 Standard Chartered’s stock price
dropped 22% after Lawsky announced the accusations on August 6,

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See generally id.
Sundaresan, supra note 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See An Unsettling Settlement: Standard Chartered Douses Incendiary
Accusations by Paying a $340M Fine, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2012,
http://www.economist.com/node/21560583.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
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2012.111 Although the settlement allowed the bank’s management to
avoid censure and continue operating in the United States, Standard
Chartered’s worldwide reputation has been impaired.112
The DFS and New York Governor Andrew Cuomo may also be
perceived as having aggressively pursued the settlement solely to
enhance their own reputational and financial postures.113 Indeed,
Governor Cuomo responded to the settlement by praising himself for
creating the DFS.114 In addition, the settlement money will flow to the
State of New York, thereby benefitting New Yorkers.115 Another major
concern involves Lawsky’s decision to move independently of federal
regulators, effectively shielding the federal government from the DFS
investigation and subsequent negotiations with Standard Chartered.
Specifically, the actions by Lawsky and the DFS created a problem for
the federal government’s own investigations of the bank.116 Because
Lawsky caught the Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice off
guard by accusing the bank of misconduct, the federal regulators found
themselves tasked with determining the course of their investigations far
sooner than they would have liked.117
Finally, Lawsky’s “lone ranger” move against Standard Chartered
has created uncertainty among several global banks.118 The DFS’s
money laundering allegations have caused global banks to worry that
their New York operations could make them public targets for
transactions that federal regulators already decided were legal.119
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
See id. (“The deal gives the DFS a notable scalp, not to mention a considerable
financial boost.”).
114. Id.; see also Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5 (referring to Governor Cuomo’s
staunch support for the creation of the DFS as a “modern regulator for today’s financial
marketplace”).
115. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 5.
116. Henning, supra note 6.
117. Id.
118. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Accusations Facing Bank Cast a Chill, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2012, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/
business/standard-chartered-case-casts-a-chill-over-the-industry.html.
119. Id. In a number of settled money-laundering cases with several European
banks, such as Lloyds, Barclays, and ING, the Department of Justice and the New York
County District Attorney’s Office did not object to the “U-Turn” transactions with Iran
that occurred before the Treasury Department issued its new ruling in November 2008.
Id.
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Indeed, federal law enforcement officials have received numerous calls
from bank executives who were worried that the rules regarding
Standard Chartered’s disputed financial transactions have suddenly
changed.120 Therefore, banks may be forced to institute new plans to
deal with the apparent divergence between state and federal law.121
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUES ARISING FROM
THE DFS SETTLEMENT
Part III of this Comment introduces a framework for mitigating the
overarching problems associated with overlapping regulatory
jurisdiction among state and federal authorities. As an initial matter, it
analyzes the consequences of the DFS settlement. Then, it discusses
how the principle of comity in the context of vertical federalism should
serve to alleviate the negative results of overlapping regulatory
jurisdiction. In doing so, this Comment argues that state and federal
regulators should be required to communicate when pursuing potential
violations, and deference should be granted to either the state or federal
regulator depending on whether the foreign bank primarily violated state
or federal law. This Part further explains that in such a scenario, federal
regulators should have primary authority to enforce federal law
violations against foreign banks, and state regulators should be afforded
primary authority to enforce violations of state law. As an alternative,
Part III also proposes amending federal legislation regarding the
regulation of foreign banks to require greater coordination—in a sense,
establishing mandatory, rather than voluntary, comity rules—between
state and federal regulators when responding to violations of law
committed by a foreign bank.
A. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR ENFORCE FEDERAL LAWS AGAINST A
FOREIGN BANK?
The DFS’s settlement with Standard Chartered raises major
concerns regarding the extent to which a state regulator should be
enforcing federal law against a foreign banking corporation.122 The DFS
120.
121.

Id.
Id. (noting the confusion among many bank executives as to whether the
banking rules have changed).
122. See Henning, supra note 6 (noting that the DFS based its case, at least in part,
on Standard Chartered’s possible violations of federal law regarding the bank’s
reporting of transactions with Iran); see also Sundaresan, supra note 6 (disparaging the
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Order dated August 6, 2012 provides numerous references to federal
issues concerning the United States Government. For instance, the
“Preliminary Statement” accuses the bank of engaging in “deceptive and
fraudulent misconduct” on behalf of Iranian financial institutions “that
were subject to U.S. economic sanctions.”123 Furthermore, the DFS
accused Standard Chartered of undertaking a course of conduct that
included “evading Federal sanctions.”124 In describing the bank’s illegal
conduct, the DFS explained that “the U.S. Government administers and
enforces a sanctions regime against those who attempt to use the U.S.
financial system in contravention of U.S. foreign policy and those
foreign countries, entities, and individuals who may present a threat to
national security.”125 Finally, under the section entitled “Apparent
Violations of Law,” the DFS accused Standard Chartered of engaging
“in transactions within the United States without complying with the
requirements of 31 C.F.R. 560.516,”126 a federal regulation.
Although Section 39 of the N.Y. Banking Law authorizes the
DFS’s superintendent to impose sanctions for federal law violations, this
authority creates a serious problem when state and federal regulators are
intent on enforcing federal laws differently.127 The DFS settlement
illuminated this problem specifically because federal regulators were on
the verge of concluding that all of Standard Chartered’s transactions
complied with federal law.128 Therefore, banks worried that the DFS’s
interpretation of Iranian sanctions would undermine any the assurances
from federal regulators that their actions were legal.129
While the ability of a state regulator to enforce federal law against
foreign banks may mitigate federal inaction, the divergence of state and
DFS for attempting to regulate activity without any specific relevance to the territory of
New York).
123. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 2.
124. Id. at 3.
125. Id. at 6.
126. Id. at 25.
127. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118 (describing the concern among banks
that state and federal regulators are interpreting the law in different ways); see also
Henning, supra note 6 (noting that federal regulators were forced to decide whether to
go forward with their own investigations far sooner than they would have liked as a
result of Lawsky’s order).
128. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118.
129. See id. (“[F]ederal law enforcement officials have been fielding a flurry of
worried calls from bank executives concerned that the rules have suddenly changed . . .
.”).
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federal regulators creates a level of uncertainty among the banking
community that can be far more devastating to the national banking
system. When banks do not understand the rules, they hesitate to
perform the transactions affected by those rules.130 When banks refuse
to engage in certain financial transactions, they may fail to provide the
services necessary to stimulate and maintain a healthy national
economy.131 In order to avoid this uncertainty and the resulting
consequences, state regulators should step aside to allow federal
regulators to maintain responsibility for enforcing federal law against
foreign banking organizations.132
The principle of comity serves to ameliorate the problems arising
from concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over foreign banks. Following
the traditional notion of judicial comity, courts give effect to the laws
and judicial systems of another state or jurisdiction as a matter of
practical deference, although they hold no actual obligation to do so.133
The principal of comity is based on a mutual respect between
jurisdictions.134 It is not a rule of law; rather, it is a voluntary expression
of deference to the policy of another jurisdiction, particularly where that
jurisdiction asserts a strong interest in the matter.135 The principle is
“grounded in notions of accommodation and good-neighborliness,” and
serves to promote balance and harmony among various state and federal
tribunals.136
The benefits of promoting comity in the regulatory sphere are
particularly evidenced when—as was the case with Standard
130. See generally Alison M. Hashmall, Note, After the Fall: A New Framework to
Regulate “Too Big to Fail” Non-Bank Financial Institutions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829,
843–44 (2010) (explaining that uncertainty can result in declined lending and
investment activity).
131. See generally id. at 844 (noting that declined lending and investment activity
can “exacerbate or even trigger panic and financial crises”).
132. See generally Sundaresan, supra note 6 (suggesting that federal regulators
should have exercised their jurisdiction over the alleged violations committed by
Standard Chartered, rather than the DFS, because they would have properly considered
“the interests of the entire nation and means of inter-state trade”).
133. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005).
134. See Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in
Merger Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1116 (2013).
135. Boudreaux v. State of La., Dep’t of Transp., 897 N.E.2d 1056, 1059 (2008);
see also Thompson v. City of Atlantic City, 921 A.2d 427, 441 (2007) (“Comity is
practiced when a court of one jurisdiction voluntarily restrains itself from interfering in
a matter falling within the purview of a court of another jurisdiction.”).
136. Thompson, 921 A.2d at 441.
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Chartered—the thrust of the claims asserted by regulators derives from a
federal law prohibiting certain transactions with a foreign nation.137 In
this situation, it seems proper based on comity for the state regulator to
defer to federal regulators, thereby supporting a coherent and accurate
administration of the federal law.138 Adherence to the principle of
comity could create a more harmonious atmosphere between state and
federal authorities, and promote efficient regulation of foreign banks
operating in the United States.139
B. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE ABLE TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY OF
FEDERAL REGULATORS?
While state regulators may often be involved in investigations of
foreign banks, the case of Standard Chartered was unique in that state
regulators usually do not take the lead in cases involving multinational
financial institutions.140 Instead of deferring to federal regulators and
prosecutors, Lawsky and the DFS moved swiftly on their own against
the bank.141 Although an active state regulator can be an integral part of
an overarching investigation of foreign banks, problems develop when
state and federal regulators fail to coordinate.142 This precise problem
occurred in the DFS settlement.143
Federal regulators, along with the general public, were blindsided
by Lawsky’s aggressive actions against Standard Chartered.144 Indeed,
the DFS accusations and resulting settlement compelled federal
137. See Sundaresan, supra note 6 (explaining that the alleged Standard Chartered
violations centered around circumvention of U.S. sanctions against Iran).
138. See generally id. (suggesting that federal regulators would have properly
considered the interests of the entire nation in deciding how to apply a federal law to a
foreign bank).
139. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 569 (2008)
(explaining how the principle of comity can help avoid interstate friction in the context
of horizontal federalism by restraining aggressive assertions of authority).
140. See Henning, supra note 6.
141. Babin, supra note 7 (discussing how Lawsky and the DFS moved forward
against Standard Chartered without the involvement of federal regulators).
142. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118 (discussing how the strong accusations
by the DFS created confusion among banks, which were relying on prior decisions by
federal regulators, as to the legality of certain financial transactions).
143. See id.
144. See Henning, supra note 6 (“Lawsky caught the Federal Reserve and the
Justice Department off guard by accusing the bank of misconduct.”).
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regulators to decide the course of their investigations sooner than they
would have liked.145 The federal regulators, such as the Federal Reserve
and the Department of Justice, also lost a valuable negotiating tactic as a
result of Lawsky’s actions.146 By failing to move in concert with other
regulators, the DFS jeopardized the federal regulators’ ability to reach a
comprehensive settlement with Standard Chartered that could have
settled all of the investigations.147 Accordingly, the federal regulators
may have subsequently found it more difficult to extract substantial
money payments from Standard Chartered since the bank had already
agreed to pay $340 million to the DFS.148
To prevent this type of “lone-ranger” move by a state regulator, the
principle of comity must control. Mutual respect that is the basis of
comity should require state and federal regulators to maintain an open
dialogue regarding their enforcement strategies,149 and state and federal
regulators should be communicating openly about their plans to
investigate or bring an enforcement action against a foreign bank.150
This could be achieved if regulatory authorities provide notice to those
with concurrent jurisdiction of when they plan either to hold a hearing or
file claims against a foreign bank.151 Had this requirement been in force,
the DFS would not have been able to covertly pursue Standard
Chartered, and thereby catch the federal regulators off-guard.
Alternatively, Congress could decide to amend the IBA to make
comity mandatory among state and federal regulators of foreign

145. Id. (noting that federal regulators were hastily placed “in the uncomfortable
position of deciding what to do with their investigations”).
146. See id. (explaining how the DFS case had the potential to jeopardize the federal
investigations of Standard Chartered).
147. See id.
148. This point is bolstered by the fact that Standard Chartered agreed on December
10, 2012 to pay $327 million in fines to federal authorities, which is even less than what
the DFS, as a single state regulator, was able to extract from the bank. See Howard
Mustoe, Standard Chartered Pays $327 Million on U.S.-Iran Transfers, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 10, 2012, 12:33 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-10/standardchartered-pays-327-million-in-u-s-iran-transfers-case.html.
149. See generally Griffith & Lahav, supra note 134, at 1116 (explaining that crossjurisdictional communication among judges may alleviate problems arising from multiforum litigation).
150. Cf. id. (advocating for open dialogue among judges presiding over rival
jurisdictions in order to strengthen inter-state relations).
151. See id. at 1126–31 (“Notice is a first step to promoting comity.”).
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banks.152 Such an amendment might induce greater coordination among
state and federal regulators by strengthening existing voluntary comity
rules, or by threatening those regulators who make overly aggressive
assertions of authority with judicial intervention.153 For example,
although Section 3105 of the IBA provides for coordination of foreign
bank examinations,154 it might also require coordination of enforcement
actions against those banks.155 If this had been adopted, the DFS may
not have been able to act independently of federal regulators in accusing
Standard Chartered of violating state and federal law.156 Rather, the
state and federal authorities could have worked together to reach a
potentially sweeping settlement with the bank that could have settled
matters definitively for all parties involved.
C. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE INVOLVING ITSELF IN ISSUES OF
FOREIGN POLICY?
By accusing Standard Chartered of violating United States
sanctions against Iran, the DFS involved itself in issues of American
foreign policy. The relevant sanctions, administered by the United
States Government through the OFAC, aims to prevent “those who
attempt to use the United States financial system in contravention of
United States foreign policy and those foreign countries, entities, and
individuals who may present a threat to national security.”157 In the case
of Iran, the United States Treasury Department revoked authorization
for the “U-Turn” transactions that Standard Chartered allegedly
processed because it suspected Iran of leveraging the transactions to
finance the Iranian nuclear weapons program.158 Lawsky clearly
152. Cf. Erbsen, supra note 139, at 569 (“Mandatory comity rules might also lead
states to avoid conflict by strengthening their existing voluntary comity rules . . . .”).
153. See id. (discussing how a constitutional common law of comity might help
avoid inter-state friction).
154. See 12 U.S.C. § 3105(c)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
155. This type of stronger coordination is both practical and reflects the legal
principle of comity. America’s Financial System: Law and Disorder, THE ECONOMIST,
Oct. 13, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21564565.
156. Although state and federal regulators have entered into various coordination
agreements with regard to state examination activities, see supra notes 35–38 and
accompanying text, these agreements do not include any provisions regarding
coordinated enforcement among state and federal regulators.
157. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 6.
158. Id. at 8.
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understood the foreign policy implications of his allegations against
Standard Chartered.159 He specifically accused the bank of designing
and implementing “an elaborate scheme by which to use its New York
branch as a front for prohibited dealings with Iran—dealings that
indisputably helped sustain a global threat to peace and stability.”160 In
fact, Lawsky stated that “[t]his is a case about Iran, money laundering
and national security.”161
The ability of the DFS, as a state regulator, to have such an impact
on foreign policy presents both a practical and constitutional problem.
Practically speaking, a New York regulator is charged with protecting
the interests of New York State, not the United States as a whole.162
Federal regulators must, however, consider the interests of the entire
nation and means of inter-state trade before deciding whether to pursue
a foreign bank allegedly violating United States sanctions against a
foreign nation.163 Federal regulators, thus, may have weighed the
negative impact on international relations and foreign trade in deciding
not to pursue claims against Standard Chartered initially.164 By bringing
such bold accusations and securing such a grand and public settlement
against Standard Chartered, however, the DFS was able to assert just as
large of an influence on foreign relations without considering the
interests of the entire nation.165 Had the DFS worked more closely with
federal regulators, Lawsky may have been more hesitant to move
against Standard Chartered, and the state and federal regulators, working
in concert, may have been able to reach a more prudent decision, taking
into account the interests of the United States as a whole.
Constitutionally, a state regulator’s ability to make decisions
affecting foreign policy may undermine federal supremacy. The United
States Constitution vests the federal government with the power to
159. See generally id. at 22 (accusing Standard Chartered of engaging in prohibited
dealings with Iran “that helped sustain a global threat to peace and stability”); Weil,
supra note 6 (noting that British officials were especially upset by Lawsky’s treatment
of Standard Chartered).
160. See Order Pursuant to N.Y. Banking Law § 39, supra note 1, at 22.
161. Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118, at 3.
162. See Sundaresan, supra note 6 (suggesting that a New York agency should be
confined to regulating banking activity that has a specific relevance to the territory of
New York).
163. See id. (explaining that federal regulators would look at the interests of the
entire nation and means of inter-state trade before making a determination regarding
potential violations committed by a foreign bank).
164. See id.
165. See id.
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regulate commerce with foreign nations.166 When Congress passes a law
regulating commerce with foreign nations, the executive branch must
faithfully execute it.167 Therefore, it is the United States Government,
through the OFAC, that has the ability to administer and enforce a
sanctions regime against Iran.168 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause,169
a New York State regulator should not be able to make foreign policy
decisions that run counter to those made by the United States
Government.170 By enforcing United States sanctions against a foreign
bank, the DFS made a decision influencing foreign policy that federal
regulators, as representatives of the United States Government, should
have made instead.171
A state regulator’s ability to enforce a federal law related to foreign
relations implicates the principle of comity, but here, international
comity among nations as well. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law (“the Restatement”) defines the parameters of comity
among nations with respect to the states, and focuses specifically on a
state’s ability to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state.172 According
to the Restatement, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to conduct that takes place within its territory.173 However, Section 403
prohibits a state from prescribing law with respect to a foreign entity,
whether or not the conduct took place within its territory, when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.174
Whether an exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is
unreasonable depends on a number of relevant factors. 175 Application

166.
167.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. In this case, the executive branch’s power to execute
the laws passed by Congress is performed by the federal regulators, as part of the
administrative state.
168. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.516 (2012).
169. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
170. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 note 5 (2012)
(“Under United States laws, any exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe by a State is
subject to applicable Constitutional limitations, notably Article I, Section 10, and to the
supremacy of United States treaties and laws.”).
171. See Sundaresan, supra note 6.
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1).
173. Id. § 402(1)(a).
174. See id. § 403(1).
175. Id. § 403(2)(a)–(h). These factors include the following:
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of these factors suggests that it is unreasonable for a New York State
authority to be involved in the regulation of a foreign bank’s
transactions with Iran.176 First, the character of the activity to be
regulated, as discussed, involves issues of foreign policy, which
traditionally are reserved for the federal government.177 Second, the
justified expectations of foreign banks have been hurt by the DFS
involvement because the banks reasonably expected, on the basis of the
federal regulators’ consensus, that the transactions they engaged in were
legal.178 Third, state regulation of a foreign bank’s transactions with
Iran appear unimportant to the international political, legal, or economic
system in light of the fact that the federal government is already attuned
to the issue.179 Fourth, state regulation here is inconsistent with the
traditions of the international system because “[i]nternational law and
international agreements of the United States are law of the United
States and supreme over the law of the several States.”180 Fifth, federal
regulators have a substantially greater interest in regulating the activity
because the dollar-clearing transactions with Iran are proscribed by
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the extent to which
the activity takes places within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable
effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the
regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or
between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of the regulation to the
regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree
to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the
regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic
system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international
system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id.
176. There is a link between the activity of Standard Chartered and the territory of
the regulating state, since the dollar-clearing transactions did take place in New York;
however, application of the remaining factors demonstrates the unreasonableness of a
state regulator’s ability to regulate a foreign bank in this case.
177. See Sundaresan, supra note 6.
178. See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118.
179. See generally Sundaresan, supra note 6.
180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 111(1).
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federal not state law.181 And finally, the DFS’s involvement with
Standard Chartered has resulted in a conflict with regulation by the
federal authorities, creating confusion among foreign banks operating in
the United States with regard to the legality of certain “U-Turn”
transactions.182 Accordingly, the DFS should not have exercised
jurisdiction over Standard Chartered’s alleged failure to comply with
federal law regarding illicit transactions with Iran.
D. SHOULD A STATE REGULATOR BE INVOLVED IN THE REGULATION OF A
FOREIGN BANK OPERATING IN THE UNITED STATES AT ALL?
Admittedly, there are some benefits to allowing a state regulatory
authority to examine and enforce violations of law against a foreign
bank operating in its state. For one, it would seem odd to permit state
authorities such as the DFS to regulate state and national banks183
operating within its territory, but not allow those authorities to regulate
the foreign banks operating there.184 After all, the state government is
charged with protecting the interests of its citizens, so it should be able
to regulate the activity of any bank that is operating on its turf.185
Furthermore, if a foreign bank is violating only state law, federal
regulators will not be inclined to intervene to enforce the law and
impose penalties.186 In addition, even if a foreign bank is violating a
federal law, a state regulator’s action may prompt federal regulators to
confront the matter, effectively providing an incentive for federal

181.
182.
183.

See 31 C.F.R. § 560.516 (2012).
See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 118.
The National Bank Act, as codified at 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2006), “generally
places national banks under federal regulatory control, with a limited exception for
states to enforce their own unclaimed property or escheat laws.” Louis P. Malick, Note
& Comment, Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C.: States Enforcing State
Laws Against National Banks, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 487, 495 (2011) (explaining that the
Act shields national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation).
184. See generally GRUSON & REISNER, supra note 8, at 74 (noting that the federal
statutes providing for the regulation of foreign banks allow state banking authorities to
retain a significant role in supervising foreign banks operating within their territory).
185. See Sundaresan, supra note 6 (suggesting that perhaps there would be no issue
with the actions of the DFS if the alleged violations committed by Standard Chartered
had some specific relevance to the territory of New York).
186. Cf. Weil, supra note 6 (suggesting that federal regulators often act
complacently even in the face of violations of federal law).
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regulators to more aggressively enforce violations of law and do a better
job of overseeing large banks.187
However, these benefits must be weighed against the negative
consequences, described above, that were implicated by the DFS
settlement with Standard Chartered. By allowing the states to regulate
foreign banks only to the extent that they are violating state law, the
benefits of state regulation largely will remain intact.188 And indeed, the
principle of comity also suggests that federal authorities should defer to
the jurisdiction of state authorities over an issue derived almost entirely
from state law.189 In such a situation, the state government would be
able to protect the interests of its citizens by holding foreign banks
accountable for violations of state law.190 In addition, a state regulator’s
action against a foreign bank for violations of state law may serve to
induce action on the part of federal regulators if the bank is also
violating federal law.191 Simultaneously, by encouraging states to defer
to federal regulators when enforcing violations of federal law, the
negative consequences of state regulation of foreign banks will be
reduced.192 Had this requirement been in place, the federal authorities
would have taken control of the Standard Chartered case, and the DFS
would have been unable to create the atmosphere of confusion among
global banks and tension with foreign nations that resulted from its own
settlement with Standard Chartered.
187.
188.

See id.
Although the DFS did base several of its accusations on violations of state law,
such as the failure to maintain accurate books and records and the falsification of books
and reports, these violations were an afterthought to the more general allegation that
Standard Chartered violated federal sanctions against Iran. In other words, all of the
state-law claims asserted were based upon Lawsky’s paramount claim that the bank
violated federal law. In cases such as this, where the underlying cause of action derives
from the bank’s violation of federal law, the state regulator should defer to federal
authorities.
189. See New York ex rel. Cuomo v. Dell, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 397, 401 (N.D.N.Y.
2007) (explaining that the principles of comity and federalism prevent the exercise of
federal jurisdiction where the case involves almost entirely an issue of state law).
190. See supra text accompanying note 186.
191. See supra text accompanying note 187.
192. It has been proposed, instead, that federal regulators should supervise national
issues, such as international money-laundering, terrorist financing, and tax matters,
while state regulators should be responsible for consumer protection. See The
Prosecutorial Maze, supra note 98, at 2. While it is true that this proposal may have
alleviated some of the problems raised by the DFS settlement, it does not serve to
minimize regulatory overlap in cases where the state regulator is enforcing a federal law
that deals with domestic or seemingly local issues. See supra Part II.C.
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CONCLUSION
The legal principle of comity suggests that for various practical
reasons, a state regulator should defer to the jurisdiction of federal
authorities when a foreign bank is accused of violating federal law.
That deference should reflect a mutual respect between state and federal
regulators that, ultimately, would minimize issues arising from
overlapping regulation and promote regulatory efficiency. In the
alternative, the IBA should be amended to require greater coordination
between state and federal regulators examining and enforcing the law
against foreign banks by imposing a mandatory comity requirement. In
effect, this would reduce the likelihood that a state regulator could act
independently and without the interests of the entire nation in mind
when deciding to assert claims against a foreign bank. This approach
attempts to balance the benefits of state regulation of foreign banks with
the potentially calamitous consequences resulting from such regulation
when, as in the case with Standard Chartered, a state regulator seeks to
impose sanctions against a foreign bank for violations of federal law.

